Allan Butler wrote:
<snip>
>> Questions:
>>
>> I understand that the router will ignore traffic not intended for it, ie
>> LAN
>> traffic. Is that true?
>
> That is what I understand also. But what happens if someone has looked at
> the operating system on that device and figured a way to get into the
> router
> and then out through the switch to the LAN? Now you are open to attack
> from your own router.
And that's not as far-fetched as it might sound, what with a bunch of them
deployed and more coming, at least in this area. Consider, though, what
sort of attack would that be? I'd expect it to be M$ oriented, and thus of
questionable relevance to the *nix systems.
> I would suggest setting up firewalls on your own personal computers as the
> lowest cost solution.
They're already in place, awaiting reconfiguring for the gateway.
> A better solution would be to find an older computer that can take two
> NIC's. Put one of the NIC's directly to the Router that you have there
> and then put the other NIC to a small workgroup switch. There are a
> number
> of firewall distributions that you can use to make this work. I use a
> distribution called smoothwall from www.smoothwall.org that I really like.
> It works quite well and has quite a few capabilities that you might like
> to have. The older computer doesn't even have to be fast or have a lot of
> memory and hard drive capacity.
Have the machine and everything. Dunno whether it's worth doing, though.
That would be a DMZ firewall, I presume. However, I'm not offering any
kind of services whatever to the outside, which means a default drop policy
except for LAN machine addresses ought to serve. Or so I would think; I'm
just learning about these matters.
If the ISP is providing DHCP that resets the outer address each time an
authorization takes place, and the router serves its purpose, what sort of
other capabilities might be valuable?
Thanks for the response!
Bill Tallman
--
Registered Linux User: #221586
Mdk-9.0 and IceWM
Gkrellm still watches over me...