Hi,
I have an esoteric problem - not sure the best approach, but here are my
thoughts.
This question has to do with disaster recovery operations and testing. Here
is the scenario:
Two machines:
MachineName_dev
MachineName_prd
Two DNS aliases:
DNSName_dev --> MachineName_dev
DNSName_prd --> MachineName_prd
During disaster testing (DR) and/or actual disaster operations, the PRD
environment points to the DEV environment:
MachineName_dev up as usual
MachineName_prd down
MachineName_prd --> points to MachineName_dev
DNSName_prd --> points to MachineName_dev
Two server processes:
IIS supports a web based application (SAS Activity Based Management)
Other TCP based application (SAS metadata server)
OK, the questions.
During DR, I don't want any inadvertent use of "DEV", as things are
configured for PRD - ABM on DEV machine configured for replicated PRD
backend database, SAS MDS on DEV machine configured for replicated PRD
metadata repository. I don't want our end users doing things in the DR
environment, thinking it's DEV, and messing up the PRD environment when
reverting back to PRD configuration.
I can manage the DNS connection requests by temporarily deleting the DEV
alias. But I can't control direct connection by the DEV machine name.
IIS - is there a way to reject incoming requests based on incoming server
name, accepting
http://MachineName_prd/whatever and
http://DNSName_prd/whatever, but rejecting
http://MachineName_dev/whatever
and
http://DNSName_dev/whatever. I'm thinking URLscan could be used here.
All TCP connections - a better (?) approach may be to reject client
connection requests by Machine_dev, but allow connection requests via
DNSName. I can then shutdown all connection requests to DEV during DR.
Of course, if I implement #2, I have to consider all scenarios, such as
network drive mapping to these machines (public shares are used to access
key directories on these machines). To do this, AFAIK we'd need to
implement
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/281308/en-us.
Thanks for any advice you can provide.
Regards,
Scott
P.S.: I'm not the network administrator, and know just enough to be
dangerous. Any advice given I'll have to forward to our network admins for
consideration.