Please don't quote backwards.
http://ursine.ca/Top_Posting
David Hettel wrote:
> Sure buy more access points and set them up their own network, put a good
> firewall between them and the hospital's network.
No, a "firewall" is not a magic fix.
http://www.samspade.org/d/firewalls.html
You need to actually know something about networking and using
routers (and not those POS home routers, either, the real Cisco thing)
to solve this problem in a way that satisfies HIPAA.
Internet connection should go into a DMZ zone consisting of only
routers, and these routers should not allow any traffic to pass from
the public to the employee network and vice versa, and nothing from
the outside to the employee network. At minimum, you're going to need
to divide things up into four zones: Internet (which should just be
the connection to the outside world), Employees (for employee access
to the hospital's IT functions and internal servers), Public (for just
public internet access, properly secured to prevent abuse as a spam
and network abuse vector vector (ie, port 25 and 119 blocked or
filtered for outgoing spam, etc), and DMZ (containing the network's
common routers between zones, as well as any servers that need to be
accessable from the outside as well as the inside, such as the
hospital's web and email servers).
If you're not sure how to accomplish this and you're the one in charge
of implementing it, now is probably the time to start shopping for a
network security consultant to come in and give you some pointers.
> If you give the public access to the hospital's network it is just a
> question of time till someone is into something they shouldn't be.
This can't happen if you know anything about network design and apply
it.