On 2008-07-19, Moe Trin <(E-Mail Removed)> wrote:
> On Sat, 19 Jul 2008, in the Usenet newsgroup comp.os.linux.networking, in
> article <slrng828c1.ajo.allergic-to-(E-Mail Removed)>,
> Jim Cochrane wrote:
>
>>Moe Trin <(E-Mail Removed)> wrote:
>
>>> Bottom line - no servers on your end means only a tiny blip of traffic
>>> as your computer tells the remote "I'm sorry, but the number you dialed
>>> is not in service - CLICK!".
>
>>Cannot a firewall be configured to simply ignore any incoming requests,
>>so that there would be no response at all, instead of saying the
>>equivalent of "not in service"?
>
> In addition to the regular HOWTOs from then LDP, see
>
> http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/HOWTO/
>
> That's the "default" result when using 'iptables' "DROP" rule. To have
> the firewall reject with an ICMP Type 3 Code 3 (Port Unreachable) or
> similar, you have to provide an extra rule of "REJECT with". In most
> cases, you provide a "default" rule which would be a DROP, but you can
> also forward it to an unused port, and have that port provide the
> "normal" RST flagged TCP packet.
Thanks, Moe, for the excellent response.
I guess the situation is a lot less black-and-white than one would be
led to believe by using GRC's port test:
https://www.grc.com/x/ne.dll?bh0bkyd2
You're one of those rare persons from whose posts people can actually
gain good, detailed knowledge, rather than just reading opinions with
perhaps a little bit of data to back them up.
Thanks.
> There is a huge debate of whether it's better to provide no response
> verses the RST or ICMP 3,3. Some feel this makes their computer
> invisible, neglecting to note that were their computer non-existent,
> the upstream router would normally provide an ICMP Type 3 Code 1 (Host
> Unreachable). I've actually seen idiots who configured their firewall
> to mimic the 'Host Unreachable' response - I say 'idiots' because the
> resulting ICMP error comes from the IP address that is supposedly
> unreachable. The lack of response causes the remote computer to make
> additional tries - so you aren't saving any bandwidth by silently
> discarding unwanted packets. As far as the bad guys are concerned, the
> lack of response confirms that the computer does exist, is reachable,
> and is using some form of firewall. This _MAY_ attract more attention
> compared to the effect of a more normal RST or ICMP 3,3. Your choice.
>
> Others think that by not responding to unwanted packets, they can hide
> information about their computer, such as operating system type and
> version. See the documentation that comes with the popular 'nmap' tool
>
> [compton ~]$ whatis nmap
> nmap (1) - Network exploration tool and security scanner
> [compton ~]$
>
> for considerably more details on this technique, and some simple means
> of defeating such probes.
>
> There is one situation when it _IS_ desirable to ignore unwanted
> packets. This is the case for UDP. Messenger spam (usually messages
> that appear to be windoze warning messages, directed to UDP ports 1025
> to 1030 or so) are often using spoofed source addresses. Looking at the
> IP headers of such packets, there are usually some glaringly obvious
> indications that the source is spoofed (such as using IP addresses that
> haven't been released by IANA - see that one fairly often). This means
> that there is no reason to send a FOAD packet to a non-existent or
> innocent host that had nothing to do with the UDP spam.
>
> Finally, there is a case where dropping packets causes you problems.
> The most common problem is 'identd' or 'auth' on tcp/113. You connect
> to a remote system, and it sends a query to this port - basically
> asking "who is your user who is connecting to my port <mumble>?". It
> waits until it gets an answer - either a response from the identd that
> is running on your system, or a port rejection from the network stack
> because you aren't running identd. If you DROP these packets, rather
> than rejecting or answering them, you have to wait ten to thirty
> seconds for the remote client to time out before your desired
> connection goes through. I see this on a number of servers I connect
> to on a regular basis. My solution is to have a special rule for
> these known servers to this specific port.
>
> The gotcha if you are silently discarding unwanted packets is that you
> have to do so for all 65536 ports and all 256 possible protocols (there
> is more to the world of IP than TCP, UDP, and ICMP). See the 'nmap'
> documentation for a lot more details and concepts.
>
> Old guy
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